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Abstract 
 
We utilise a new international database of financial fragility indicators for 124 countries from 
1998 to 2012 to investigate the effects of fragility on the finance-growth nexus. Cross-country 
growth regressions suggest that both financial fragility and private credit have negative effects 
on GDP growth over this period. The results are robust to controlling for systemic banking 
crises, confirming that financial fragility has additional negative effects on growth, even if a 
banking crisis is avoided.  We also present results using interactions which suggest that (a) a 
large volume of impaired loans can amplify the negative effects of private credit on growth and 
(b) a sufficiently high z-score can eradicate the negative effects of private credit on growth.  
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the view that finance is good 
for growth,1 which has dominated the thinking of policy makers for nearly three decades,2 is 
coming under renewed scrutiny. New evidence shows that the relationship between finance 
and growth has vanished in more recent data (e.g., Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Demetriades 
and Rousseau, 2016) or that it can turn negative once a certain threshold of financial 
development has been reached (e.g., Arcand, et al., 2015). This literature argues that the 
weakening or reversal of the finance-growth nexus reflects the effects of systemic banking 
crises on growth, which are themselves widely documented (e.g., Laeven and Valencia, 
2013).  Others have suggested that financial development, particularly where it occurs 
through deregulation or liberalization, diverts human capital away from technological 
innovation into less productive activities by artificially inflating reward structures in finance 
(e.g., Ang, 2011; Andrianova et al., 2012; Kneer, 2013).    
An alternative and perhaps more obvious channel through which the potentially 
positive effects of financial development on growth can be weakened or reversed is that of 
financial fragility. Low credit quality, inadequate bank capital buffers and low profitability 
are likely to result in a reduction of credit for long-term investment, as banks try to improve 
their capital ratios by reducing the total amount of risk-weighted assets (the denominator).  
                                                          
1 Levine (2003), for example, states that “…countries with better-developed financial systems 
tend to grow faster - specifically, those with (i) large, privately owned banks that funnel 
credit to private enterprises and (ii) liquid stock exchanges….The size of the banking system 
and the liquidity of stock markets are each positively linked to growth. Simultaneity bias does 
not seem to be the cause of this result.” 
  
2 Exceptions include Demetriades and Hussein (1996), who provide time-series evidence 
suggesting that finance follows growth in LDCs more often than not, and Andrianova et al. 
(2008), who suggest that privatising government-owned banks can be detrimental to financial 
development and growth when contract enforcement and regulation are weak. See also 
Deidda and Fatouh (2002) and Rioja and Valev (2004), who suggest a non-monotone 
relationship between finance and growth. 
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High levels of impaired loans may also increase the cost of new credit to firms and 
households as banks attempt to recoup lost interest income by raising lending rates.  
Furthermore, under-capitalised banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving towards 
riskier assets with higher short-term returns within the same regulatory risk category.3 At the 
extreme, under-capitalised banks may gamble for resurrection, by financing highly risky 
investments, such as pursuing ‘white elephant’ (i.e., unprofitable) projects (Llewellyn, 1999).  
To sum-up, financial fragility is likely to erode the ability of banks to finance productive 
investment and growth, even if it does not lead to a full-blown crisis.  
 Although the possible effects of weak bank balance sheets on bank lending are 
reasonably well understood,4 the effects of financial fragility on growth remain relatively 
under-researched in the empirical literature. This is partly because their estimation would 
normally require using explicit and reliable measures of financial fragility, which, until 
recently, have not been widely available.5 Another plausible reason why the effects of 
financial fragility on growth may have remained under-researched could be that financial 
fragility has been closely linked to financial crises – after all, fragility itself is often defined 
as vulnerability of a financial system to crisis. Researchers may, therefore, interpret financial 
crises and financial fragility as more-or-less synonymous and choose to study the effects of 
crises on growth, using banking crisis dummies that are relatively abundant in the literature 
(e.g., Laeven and Valencia, 2013).   
                                                          
3 They can, for example, shift towards riskier sovereign bonds, which continue to carry a zero 
regulatory risk weight. 
 
4 See, for example, chapter 5 “Financial Systems in Distress” in World Bank (1989).   
 
5 Loayza and Ranciere (2006) provide an empirical analysis of the effects of financial 
fragility on growth without using explicit measures of fragility. They do this by ascribing the 
negative short-run effects of financial development on growth to financial fragility. 
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 It is, however, important to investigate the extent to which financial fragility has 
effects on growth over and above the effects of crises, not least because many countries may 
be able to avoid a full-blown crisis but could stagnate for decades because of financial 
fragility. Quantifying the effects of financial fragility on growth may also shed light on the 
extent to which the weakening or reversal of the finance-growth nexus can be attributed to 
financial fragility. To this end, we utilise a new international database on financial fragility 
for 124 countries from 1998 through 2012 developed by Andrianova et al. (2015) to 
investigate the effects of fragility on the finance-growth nexus. Unlike previous datasets that 
contain indicators of financial fragility for commercial banks (e.g., the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators), this database includes all types of deposit-taking institutions as well 
as investment banks. It is, therefore, shown to produce more reliable estimates of financial 
fragility, particularly in countries where financial intermediaries such as real estate and 
mortgage banks, cooperative banks, savings banks, Islamic banks or investment banks play a 
prominent role. In countries like Germany, for example, focusing on commercial banks alone 
can over-estimate financial fragility. By contrast, in the United States, if real estate and 
mortgage banks and investment banks are excluded ‒ which are known to have played an 
important role in the build-up to the sub-prime crisis ‒ financial fragility will be under-
estimated.6 
 Our results reveal that financial fragility has significant negative effects on growth, 
independently of the effects of banking crises. These effects are economically large, 
suggesting that avoiding a crisis is not sufficient to eliminate the sizeable effects of financial 
fragility on growth. They also show that private credit – which has been the main indicator 
used to capture financial deepening in the finance-growth literature – has negative effects on 
                                                          
6 In certain countries the activities of investment banks are not entirely separate from their 
commercial counterparts, further warranting the inclusion of investment banks. 
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growth in the period under study, and that these effects are surprisingly robust but can be 
mitigated by very low levels of financial fragility. 
   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the baseline regressions and shows that the effects of 
financial fragility are robust to the inclusion of banking crisis dummies. Section 4 presents 
additional insights into the relationship between financial fragility, financial development and 
growth by analysing interactions between private credit and financial fragility indicators. 
Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
2. Empirical strategy and data 
2.1 Estimation  
To estimate the benchmark relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, we follow the specification of King and Levine (1993). In addition, we include 
financial fragility in the set of conditioning variables. Equation 1 shows this variant of the 
Barro growth regression where Y represents growth, FD financial development, FF a measure 
of financial fragility, and X the vector of covariates. Subscript i indexes individual countries, 
whereas t indexes time. The error term is denoted by ε. 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
 The coefficients of interest are both 𝛾 and 𝛿, where the first measures the impact of 
financial deepening on growth and the latter measures the responsiveness of growth to 
financial fragility. To help identify the coefficients and reduce simultaneity bias, we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Specifically, we use the predetermined values of the 
explanatory variables at the start of each period as instruments, thus exploiting some of the 
time series variation in the data. Equations 2 and 3 represent the IV estimator where Equation 
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2 represents fitted values with a circumflex, and for brevity, Equation 3 represents only the 
financial development first stage of the IV equation.   
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽?̂?𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝐹?̂?𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛿𝐹?̂?𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (2) 
 
𝐹?̂?𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝐹𝐷𝑖,0  +  𝛿𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜂𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
 
Given that the initial values of the financial fragility measures, trade openness to GDP, 
government spending to GDP, and schooling are used to instrument their respective period 
averages, our model is exactly identified. In other specifications we interact the financial 
development variable with our selected financial fragility measures as outlined in Equation 4.   
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽?̂?𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝐹?̂?𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜌𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡̂  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
 
2.2 Data 
We use data for 124 countries over the time period 2000-2011.7 Both the number of 
countries and time period are based upon the availability of our indicators of financial 
fragility. The data are averaged across four non-overlapping three-year periods. We do this to 
smooth the financial and macroeconomic data and to avoid sample bias, where otherwise the 
sample may be dominated by countries that report more reliable and historical data. Ideally, a 
longer time dimension in our data would be better since it would allow smoothing over four 
or five year periods. However, as we bring several databases together to address the growth 
effects of financial fragility, this ultimately limits both the duration of the study and the 
length of each cross section. Table 1 includes summary statistics.   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
                                                          
7 Depending on the specification, the number of countries and observations falls from the 
theoretical maximum of 124 countries and 496 observations, as the time series is averaged 
into four 3-year periods. 
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We bring the data together from World Development Indicators (2016), the New 
International Database of Financial Fragility (2015), and the list of financial crises from the 
database developed by Laeven and Valencia (2013). The dependent variable is growth in 
GDP per capita, and along with trade openness, secondary schooling, government spending 
and private credit, is from World Development Indicators. Growth over the time period is 
generally positive and when graphed appears normally distributed. Over 68% of the annual 
growth rates in the sample lie within the range of 0.6-8.3%. In the specifications, we include 
the natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita to measure the “catching up effect” in which 
countries that tend to be more developed tend to have lower growth rates due to conditional 
convergence. Trade openness to GDP is measured as a percentage and exhibits large values 
in the right hand side of the distribution, but these are accountable and comprised of nations 
such as Singapore that, despite their small size, are engaged in high trade activity. 
Government spending is also reported as a ratio to GDP and is measured in percentage terms. 
Schooling is measured as the gross secondary schooling enrolment ratio, traditional in the 
literature, where the variable is logged following King and Levine (1993). Private credit is 
the variable that we use to measure financial development.  The variable is measured as a 
percentage of domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP. It is a commonly used 
variable to measure deepening of the financial sector in the academic literature, as it 
measures the intermediation ability of the financial sector.     
The financial fragility variables are from the New International Database of Financial 
Fragility developed by Andrianova et al. (2015). Four measures are used in this paper and 
include the impaired loans ratio, provision coverage, leverage and the Z-Score. The impaired 
loans ratio is measured as the number of impaired loans (loans where payment is 90 days 
past its due date) divided by total gross loans, multiplied by 100 to provide a percentage. A 
higher ratio implies greater financial fragility. Provision coverage is measured as the number 
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of reserves that cover potential losses (impaired loans) and is also in percentage terms. 
Greater provision coverage will imply that more precautionary measures are put in place that 
increase financial soundness, therefore a positive value represents less fragility. Leverage is 
measured as total assets divided by equity. Finally, the Z-Score measures the distance the 
banking sector is from insolvency. A greater Z-Score therefore implies greater financial 
stability (or lower fragility), where a unit increase represents a one standard deviation move 
away from insolvency. 
The correlations between the financial development measure private credit and the 
fragility variables reported in Table 2 and are generally low, with the highest correlation 
observed between leverage and private credit (0.32). 
Insert Table 2 here 
 In our preferred specifications we also include a dummy variable to indicate whether 
a given country experienced a financial crisis in a given time period following work by 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). The financial crisis dummy variable is available from the 
Laeven and Valencia (2013) dataset and ends in 2011, which is the main reason why our 
sample concludes in the same year.    
3. Baseline Results and Regional Variation 
3.1 Baseline Regressions 
Table 3 presents the benchmark estimations.  Column 1 replicates the standard King 
and Levine (1993) regression using our new data, which in contrast to their work for the 
1960-1989 period, now shows a negative and significant coefficient on private credit. The   
coefficient suggests that a ten percentage point increase in private credit is associated with 
0.14 percentage points of additional growth, ceteris paribus.8 The remaining control variables 
                                                          
8 In supplementary regressions (not reported), we test for a non-linear relationship between finance and 
growth, by including the square of private credit in all the regressions in Table 3.  When including this 
additional variable, neither the level or square term of private credit is significant but in some columns the 
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enter the specifications with their expected signs, although only trade openness and 
government spending are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
                                               Insert Table 3 here 
Columns 2-5 add our financial fragility variables to the specification one at a time. In 
column 2, we include impaired loans and it enters with the expected negative sign and is 
significant at the 5% level. A 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of impaired loans to 
total loans, indicating greater fragility, has large repercussions on economic growth, reducing 
it by 0.6 percentage points. The inclusion of impaired loans also reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the private credit variable by 25%. In column 3, the fragility variable is 
provision coverage, which enters with its expected positive sign at the 10% level. A 10 
percentage point increase in coverage may enhance economic growth by only 0.03 
percentage points, but the negative coefficient on private credit declines in magnitude to less 
than 0.01.  
We introduce leverage in column 4 of Table 3, where it enters with a positive sign. A 
10 unit increase in leverage may increase economic growth by 0.35 percentage points. This 
may seem surprising given the recent emphasis of regulators on the deleterious effects of 
leverage on banking risks, but we note that we are already controlling directly for the 
potentially negative effects of balance sheet quality. Any remaining effects may then capture 
the efficiency of intermediation, and are therefore likely to be positive, as suggested by 
Rousseau (1998). The coefficient on private credit is negative and now statistically 
significant at the 1% level, and its magnitude is similar to that observed in column 1.  
The Z-Score serves as our final measure of financial fragility in column 5 of Table 3.  
It enters the specification with the expected positive sign, as an increase in the Z-Score 
                                                          
variables are jointly significant.  Nevertheless, all the indicators of financial fragility are unaffected when 
including the squared term into the specifications, therefore we have reason to believe that the inclusion of a 
squared term in the specifications is unnecessary.    
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represents a decrease in fragility, but is not statistically significant. The final column of Table 
1 places all of the financial fragility indicators into the specification simultaneously. The 
results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in private credit is associated with a fall in 
growth by 0.14 percentage points, just as in column 1. The magnitude of the impaired loans 
variable is similar to that reported in column 2, but its significance level falls to the 10% 
level. The coefficient on leverage, on the other hand, increases in magnitude where a 10 unit 
increase in leverage relates to growth that is 0.48 percentage points higher. In this 
specification, provision coverage is now insignificant.  
The control variables for columns 2-6 that include the financial fragility measures all 
enter with their expected signs.  Trade openness is positive and significant throughout all five 
additional columns, and government spending retains its significance in all five additional 
columns.  There is some weak evidence of the “catching-up effect” as in columns 2 and 6 the 
coefficient on initial GDP per capita is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
 
3.2 Introducing regional variation  
Figure 1 shows the variation in growth rates across four broadly-defined regions 
worldwide. First, we see that the Eastern European and Central Asian countries 
(predominantly former countries within the Soviet Union) exhibit a very high average growth 
rate over the sample period, just short of 6%.9 The next highest growth rate is then that of 
sub-Saharan Africa, averaging approximately 5%. Interestingly we observe the lowest 
average growth for Latin America and the Caribbean, although it is not too dissimilar to the 
average for the remaining countries in our sample.   
                                                   Insert Figure 1 here 
                                                          
9 To classify countries into regions we use World Bank classifications. The statistics in 
Figure 1 are unweighted averages of the countries within each region. 
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While the original King and Levine (1993) paper uses  84 countries in its preferred 
empirical specifications, our addition of many former Soviet states and estimation over a 
more recent time period serves to differentiate our work from it. The structural differences in 
former Communist states needs to be accounted for, of course, as does that of the 
dysfunctional credit markets that are widespread in sub-Saharan Africa.  Whilst the growth 
rate of Latin America is incredibly similar to the remaining sample, during the early sample 
period, Latin America had widespread crises across several countries.  In particular, 
Uruguay’s banking system almost collapsed in 2002, where government intervention was 
required after a run on the banks by depositors.  As a result, Table 4 includes three regional 
dummies, corresponding to the regions in Figure 1, into the regression specification.   
                                                 Insert Table 4 here 
The presentation of results in Table 4 follows that of Table 3, where in the first 
column we estimate the benchmark specification omitting all of the financial fragility 
variables. The coefficient on private credit is negative and significant as in the corresponding 
column of Table 3, although the variable is now statistically significant at the 1% level. Both 
trade openness and government spending remain significant, although the former is now only 
significant at the 10% level. Examining the regional dummies, while the Sub-Saharan African 
dummy and Eastern European dummies are insignificant, the coefficient for Latin America 
and the Caribbean is statistically significant at the 1% level. Being located in this region 
depresses growth by 1.8 percentage points, which represents a large decline. We add our first 
fragility variable, impaired loans, into the specification in column 2, where it enters with a 
greater magnitude than in Table 3. A 10 percentage point increase in impaired loans may 
reduce the economic growth rate by as much as 0.7 percentage points. The coefficient on 
financial development is identical to that in column two of Table 3, and the estimate is more 
precise, with a lower standard error.  
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The third column of Table 4 includes provision coverage as the fragility variable, and 
it enters positively and significantly at the 10% level. The coefficient indicates that a 10 
percentage point increase in provision coverage may increase economic growth by 0.04 
percentage points.  The coefficient on private credit is quite similar to that in column 2, 
although higher in magnitude than the corresponding column in Table 3. In column 4, the 
financial fragility indicator, leverage, is positive and significant at the 10% level. A 10 unit 
increase in leverage is related to growth that is 0.3 percentage points higher and private credit 
remains negative and significant. The Z-Score in column 5 of Table 4 is not statistically 
significant, although correctly signed, just as it is in Table 3 whereas the coefficient on 
private credit is negative and significant at the 5% level.  
The regression reported in the final column in Table 4 includes all of our fragility 
indicators in a single specification. The coefficient on private credit is negative and 
significant, where a 10 percentage point increase may reduce economic growth by just over 
0.1 percentage points. Three of the four fragility indicators are statistically significant. The 
impaired loans variable enters the specification negatively and both leverage and the Z-Score 
enter positively.   Examining the control variables in Table 4, we find that trade openness has 
a coefficient slightly lower in magnitude than in the corresponding columns of Table 3 and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  Government expenditure on the other hand has 
coefficient values that are slightly higher in magnitude but remains significant at the 1% 
level.  The evidence of the catching up effect still occurs in columns 2 and 6.  The inclusion 
of the regional dummies is important as documented by the results in Table 4.  Being located 
in Latin America and the Caribbean may depress economic growth by approximately 2 
percentage points, where this variable is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Whilst the 
regional dummy on Sub-Saharan Africa is insignificant in Table 4, the regional dummy on 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia becomes significant in columns 4-6 lending further support 
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for the inclusion of regional effects.  Location in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is seen as 
beneficial to economic growth with the estimates suggesting that it may increase growth 
between 1.17-1.40 percentage points.  
 
4. Financial crises, fragility and growth 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) recover the positive relationship between financial 
deepening and economic growth by controlling for financial crises. In Table 5 we introduce a 
dummy variable for a financial crisis into the specification to examine one of two things: 
first, whether like Rousseau and Wachtel (2011), we can uncover a positive relationship 
between finance and growth; and second, whether or not our financial fragility indicators 
have an additional impact on economic growth over and above financial crises. Whereas the 
financial fragility indicators are shown to be good crisis predictors (Demetriades et al., 2016), 
it is also very plausible that the indicators have an independent impact on the economy. For 
example, a financial system may be incredibly fragile and impede growth without the 
economy ever experiencing a financial crisis.   
                                                      Insert Table 5 here 
Table 5 presents the results when the financial crisis dummy is included in the 
specification. In the benchmark estimates reported in column 1, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on private credit falls compared to those reported in Tables 3 and 4. A 10 
percentage point increase in private credit is shown to reduce growth by 0.12 percentage 
points, ceteris paribus. The crisis dummy enters with a large and negative coefficient as 
expected, and is significant at the 1% level. Having a financial crisis is shown to reduce 
annual economic growth by approximately 1.2 percentage points.  
When we introduce our financial fragility variables in column 2, the impaired loans 
ratio remains negative and significant. This is important as it shows that even after 
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accounting for financial crises, a 10 percentage point increase in the impaired loans ratio may 
depress economic growth by 0.6 percentage points.  Interestingly the coefficient on private 
credit is reduced and only just significant at the 10% level. Ceteris paribus, a 10 percentage 
point increase in financial depth is now only associated with a 0.085 reduction in growth, 
stripping away some of the negative effects of financial deepening once financial crises and 
poor loan portfolios enter the accounting.  
When the chosen measure of fragility is provision coverage in column 3, it is not 
statistically significant in the regression specification, but so also is the coefficient on private 
credit. In column 4 of Table 5 the financial fragility indicator is leverage, which enters 
positively and significantly with a magnitude similar to previous Tables. The coefficient on 
financial deepening however, falls relative to those in Tables 3 and 4, although it remains 
negative and significant at the 5% level. The crisis dummy is still highly significant with a 
negative sign, where experiencing a financial crisis is associated with a reduction in growth 
by 1.4 percentage points. Column 5 of Table 5 replaces the leverage with the Z-Score. While 
the Z-Score is not significant, its coefficient is positive, and by introducing this fragility 
variable and the financial crisis dummy, the magnitude of private credit falls compared to the 
corresponding columns in Tables 3 and 4.  
The final column of Table 5 shows the preferred regression. Here all four financial 
fragility indicators are entered together in addition to the regional and crisis dummies. While 
private credit is negative and significant at the 5% level, its magnitude, as in the previous 
columns, is lower than those reported in Tables 3 and 4. A 10 percentage point increase in 
financial depth is associated with just over a 0.1 percentage point decline in growth. Three of 
the four financial fragility variables are significant in this specification ‒ impaired loans, 
leverage and the Z-Score ‒ and all enter with their expected signs. A 10 percentage point 
increase in the impaired loans ratio may decrease growth by 0.65 percentage points, whereas 
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a 10 unit increase in leverage is associated with economic growth that is 0.46 percentage 
points higher. Finally, the Z-Score albeit significant only at the 10% level, suggests that a 10 
percent increase in overall bank health may increase growth by approximately 0.3 percentage 
points.  Finally, the financial crisis dummy is negative and significant, where having a crisis 
may reduce growth by approximately 1 percentage point. The covariates in Table 5 are 
incredibly similar to those of Table 4, where trade openness, government spending and the 
reginal dummy of Latin America and the Caribbean all remain statistically significant, with 
their expected signs. In column two and six, initial GDP per capita is negative and significant 
providing evidence of a catching up effect, and the dummy for the region of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia is positive and significant at the 10% level in columns 4-6.   
Importantly the results suggest that, even with the inclusion of the financial crisis 
dummy, the positive relationship between financial deepening and economic growth is not 
recovered, and moreover, that the fragility indicators have an independent impact on 
depressing economic growth in addition to their effects through financial crises.  In further 
robustness tests, we restricted the sample size to 288 in columns 1-5 to examine whether or 
not the reduced sample was driving the results in the final column.  Whilst, the financial 
fragility indicators are unaffected with a smaller sample when they are examined 
individually, the private credit variable loses significance in a couple of columns.  Overall 
based on this evidence, we are confident that the results are not affected by sample bias.   
Table 6 offers some further evidence of the relationship between financial deepening, 
fragility and economic growth. Here we interact the financial fragility variables with private 
credit and evaluate the marginal effects of each interaction at the median. We would expect to 
see, as financial fragility decreases, the impact of private credit on economic growth become 
positive (or at least less negative). 
                                                  Insert Table 6 here 
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Using the same additional covariates as the specifications in Table 5, when we 
evaluate the interaction of private credit with the ratio of impaired loans at the median value 
(of impaired loans) of 4.93%, the coefficient on private credit is still negative but is no longer 
significant. Examining Figure 2A, we see that the coefficient on private credit becomes 
negative and statistically significant only when impaired loans approach 6% of total gross 
loans.10 The second specification, which includes provision coverage as the indicator of 
financial fragility, yields a negative coefficient when evaluated at the median of 91% on 
private credit that is negative and significant, albeit at the 10% level. However, as Figure 2B 
shows, once provision coverage approaches 100% (i.e., all impaired loans are provisioned 
for), the negative effect of private credit on growth vanishes. This presents a solid argument 
for banks to keep a close eye on the amount of reserves they hold to cover any troublesome 
loans. Column 3 considers the interaction between financial deepening and leverage. At the 
median leverage value of 10.82, private credit is negative and statistically significant, 
although increasing leverage seems to reduce those negative effects. Since decreases in the 
ratio of capital to assets, despite their implications for a rising debt ratio, could be viewed as a 
measure of confidence in the banking sector (e.g., Rousseau, 1998; Jaremski and Rousseau, 
2015), we could be seeing opposing forces at work as leverage rises, both positive and 
negative, but with the positive effects taking on additional influence. The final column of 
Table 6 interacts the Z-Score with private credit.  At the median value of 14.5 the coefficient 
on private credit is negative and significant at the 5% level. However, increasing the Z-Score, 
as shown in Figure 2D, shows the negative aspect of financial deepening on growth 
disappearing as the Z-score reaches 20. More importantly, a healthy financial system (i.e., Z-
Score of approximately 40) begins to turn the coefficient on private credit positive. This 
suggests that policies focused more on the stability of the financial system (inverse of 
                                                          
10 In addition to the coefficient, the 95% confidence intervals are graphed in Figures 2A-2D.   
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fragility) could work toward regaining the potential benefits of financial development on 
growth.    
                              Insert Figure 2 (panels A-D) here      
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
Our findings suggest that the relationship between financial development and growth 
has been changing. Specifically, both financial fragility and private credit appear to have 
negative effects on GDP growth during 1998-2012, over and above the negative effects of 
systemic banking crises. A large volume of impaired loans is shown to amplify the negative 
effects of private credit on growth while a sufficiently high Z-score, reflecting a healthy 
banking system, can eradicate the negative effects of private credit on growth. Our results 
suggest that regulators need to focus their attention on improving bank balance sheets by 
addressing non-performing loans and increasing capital buffers that can make banks more 
resilient to future shocks. Addressing financial fragility will not only help to avoid banking 
crises, but could well help to regenerate the virtuous cycle between finance and growth. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
   Deviation     
Economic Growth 4.45 3.86 -10.26 29.77 
Private Credit 46.77 46.32 0.41 202.01 
Impaired Loans 7.50 7.36 0.19 60.60 
Provision Coverage 118.93 89.08 2.24 664.39 
Leverage 12.94 8.61 2.32 100.94 
Z-Score 14.89 10.68 -9.45 69.81 
Initial GDP per capita 14225.43 14974.68 503.96 75777.40 
Trade Openness 84.18 55.09 20.58 418.20 
Secondary Schooling 72.02 32.61 6.88 157.30 
Government Spending 15.49 6.09 2.80 45.70 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  Private Impaired Provision Leverage Z-Score 
 Credit Loans Coverage     
Private Credit 1         
Impaired Loans -0.26 1    
Provision Coverage -0.05 -0.31 1   
Leverage 0.32 0.05 -0.16 1  
Z-Score 0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.08 1 
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Table 3: Dependent Variable - Annual Growth (%) Three Year Averages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
Private -0.0144** -0.0108* -0.0097* -0.0157*** -0.0132** -0.0143**  
Credit (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0058)    
       
Impaired  -0.0604**    -0.0592*   
Loans  (0.0306)    (0.0310)    
       
Provision   0.0038*   0.0035    
Coverage   (0.0023)   (0.0023)    
       
Leverage    0.0347**  0.0483*** 
    (0.0170)  (0.0148)    
       
Z-Score     0.0134 0.0234    
     (0.0164) (0.0173)    
       
GDP -0.2334 -0.8276** -0.6310 -0.4290 -0.4304 -0.8264**  
per capita (0.3913) (0.4156) (0.4045) (0.3205) (0.3203) (0.4095)    
       
Trade 0.0154** 0.0086*** 0.0089*** 0.0088*** 0.0080*** 0.0104*** 
Openness (0.0074) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0034)    
       
Secondary 0.1415 0.9821 0.6796 0.6600 0.5726 1.0189    
Schooling (0.6991) (0.6340) (0.6449) (0.5562) (0.5485) (0.6371)    
       
Government -0.1518*** -0.1166*** -0.1068*** -0.1131*** -0.1153*** -0.1098*** 
Expenditure (0.0351) (0.0372) (0.0398) (0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0403)    
       
Constant 7.7501*** 9.7354*** 8.0916*** 6.8279*** 7.4314*** 8.0393*** 
 (1.8039) (2.5433) (2.2257) (1.9335) (1.8385) (2.6129)    
20 
 
       
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.16 
Observations 347 293 293 335 340 288 
Notes: All estimates are from two-stage least squares using robust standard errors and with standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All 
covariates with the exception of initial GDP are instrumented using their initial values in each period.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average annual growth rates by region, 1998-2012. 
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Table 4: Dependent Variable - Annual Growth (%) Three Year Averages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
Private -0.0151*** -0.0108** -0.0109** -0.0141*** -0.0125** -0.0135*** 
Credit (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0052)    
       
Impaired  -0.0681**    -0.0654**  
Loans  (0.0313)    (0.0306)    
       
Provision   0.0043*   0.0036    
Coverage   (0.0025)   (0.0023)    
       
Leverage    0.0300*  0.0463*** 
    (0.0174)  (0.0149)    
       
Z-Score     0.0228 0.0353**  
     (0.0162) (0.0177)    
       
GDP -0.1896 -0.7781* -0.5381 -0.4278 -0.4295 -0.7417*   
per capita (0.4104) (0.4136) (0.4032) (0.3247) (0.3229) (0.4078)    
       
Trade 0.0134* 0.0057* 0.0058* 0.0065** 0.0058** 0.0068**  
Openness (0.0072) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0031)    
       
Secondary -0.0899 0.5143 0.2983 0.3146 0.1731 0.6643    
Schooling (0.6500) (0.6517) (0.6472) (0.5693) (0.5666) (0.6557)    
       
Government -0.1772*** -0.1647*** -0.1578*** -0.1409*** -0.1440*** -0.1714*** 
Expenditure (0.0398) (0.0435) (0.0447) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0454)    
       
Eastern Europe 0.9164 1.1131 0.9365 1.1685* 1.2036* 1.3974*   
& Central Asia (0.6802) (0.7147) (0.7582) (0.6817) (0.6830) (0.7664)    
       
Sub-Saharan -0.4222 -0.8463 -0.7669 -0.4977 -0.6542 -0.4496    
Africa (0.5389) (0.5666) (0.5891) (0.5200) (0.4905) (0.5886)    
       
Latin -1.7880*** -1.8940*** -2.1188*** -1.6070*** -1.6779*** -1.9558*** 
America (0.4522) (0.4742) (0.4952) (0.4730) (0.4425) (0.4993)    
       
Constant 9.1697*** 12.6212*** 10.2738*** 9.0468*** 9.7775*** 10.0137*** 
 (2.0973) (2.6572) (2.3421) (2.1228) (1.9622) (2.7435)    
       
R-Squared 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.23 
Observations 347 293 293 335 340 288 
Notes: All estimates are from two-stage least squares regressions using robust standard errors and with 
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
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respectively. All covariates with the exception of initial GDP and the dummies are instrumented using their 
initial values in each period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Dependent Variable - Annual Growth (%) Three Year Averages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
Private -0.0123** -0.0085* -0.0084 -0.0109** -0.0097** -0.0114**  
Credit (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0049)    
       
Impaired  -0.0604**    -0.0645**  
Loans  (0.0305)    (0.0300)    
       
Provision   0.0038   0.0032    
Coverage   (0.0025)   (0.0024)    
       
Leverage    0.0322**  0.0459*** 
    (0.0158)  (0.0140)    
       
Z-Score     0.0146 0.0285*    
     (0.0161) (0.0175)    
       
GDP -0.0848 -0.6541 -0.4350 -0.3047 -0.3227 -0.6576    
per capita (0.4060) (0.4151) (0.4002) (0.3200) (0.3197) (0.4085)    
       
Trade 0.0126* 0.0051* 0.0052* 0.0057** 0.0051** 0.0063**  
Openness (0.0073) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0031)    
       
Secondary -0.2464 0.3453 0.1447 0.1409 0.0238 0.5400    
Schooling (0.6487) (0.6524) (0.6482) (0.5652) (0.5622) (0.6496)    
       
Government -0.1730*** -0.1584*** -0.1519*** -0.1339*** -0.1376*** -0.1633*** 
Expenditure (0.0399) (0.0438) (0.0447) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0458)    
       
Eastern Europe 1.0793 1.2220* 1.0728 1.3684** 1.3055* 1.4531*   
& Central Asia (0.6741) (0.7103) (0.7487) (0.6739) (0.6765) (0.7609)    
       
Sub-Saharan -0.4381 -0.8743 -0.8060 -0.5200 -0.6754 -0.5135    
Africa (0.5329) (0.5639) (0.5816) (0.5082) (0.4855) (0.5805)    
       
Latin -1.7170*** -1.8254*** -2.0196*** -1.5288*** -1.6174*** -1.8974*** 
America (0.4352) (0.4606) (0.4767) (0.4527) (0.4286) (0.4903)    
       
Crisis -1.1975*** -1.0072** -1.0685** -1.4315*** -1.1762** -0.9326**  
Dummy (0.4612) (0.4570) (0.4698) (0.4776) (0.4627) (0.4615)    
       
Constant 8.8509*** 12.1021*** 10.0022*** 8.5640*** 9.5079*** 9.8653*** 
 (2.0650) (2.6548) (2.3009) (2.0957) (1.9313) (2.7380)    
       
R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.23   
Observations 347 293 293 335 340 288    
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Notes: All estimates are from two-stage least squares using robust standard errors and with standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All 
covariates with the exception of initial GDP and the dummies are instrumented using their initial values in 
each period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effect of Interaction Variables at Median 
Variable Name Impaired Provision Leverage Z-Score 
 Loans Coverage     
     
Coefficient -0.0085 -0.0087* -0.0140*** -0.0101** 
 (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0048) 
     
Median Value 4.93 91.10 10.82 14.52 
Notes: All estimates are from IV regressions using robust standard errors with 
standard errors in parentheses. The regression specification includes all the 
covariates from Table 5, with the exception of the fragility indicators that are now 
interacted with private credit. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 2D 
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